

Are Robust Circuits Really Robust?



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Outline

- Motivation
- “Robustness Checking”
 - Self-Checking Circuits – Theory and Practice
 - Technical Challenges and Solutions
- Yield and Quality
 - “Fault Tolerant Yield”
 - “Quality Binning”
- Conclusions


μElectronic is everywhere

more than 80 μProcessors to control various functions (ABS, ..., Infotainment, ...)



Major Problem so far

- „Spot defects“, „random defects“ during manufacturing



[<http://www.icyield.com>]

Nanoscale Integration


- Potential for integrating highly complex innovative products into single chip (SoC) or package (SiP)
- Problems
 - Soft errors
 - Parameter variations
cf. Borkar, IEEE Micro 2005



Soft Errors

- Caused by
 - Alpha particles, cosmic radiation
- Measures
 - SER (Soft Error Rate) given in
 - FIT (Failure in Time)
1 FIT = 1 failure in 10^9 hours ($\approx 114,155$ years)
- Example
 - SER for μ Processor with embedded SRAM is 50,000 FIT
(1 soft error every 2 years)
 - But: Multiprocessor system with 100 chips has 1 failure per week


SER for Latches/Flipflops in Random Logic



[Baumann, IEEE Design&Test 2005]


Parameter Variations

- Static variations
 - Systematic
 - Random
- Dynamic variations
- Variations over time (aging)



Example: Random Dopant Fluctuations


- Threshold voltage V_{th}
 - Determined by the concentration of dopant atoms in the channel
 - Only a few dopant atoms in nano scale transistors
 - Law of large numbers is no longer valid, quantum effects must be considered



[Borkar, IEEE Micro 2005]

Dynamic Parameter Variations


- „Power density“ in a μ Processor chip
- Problems
 - Hot spots
 - Varying supply voltage
 - ...



[Borkar, IEEE Micro 2005]

Consequences

Most parameter variations result in timing variations




Traditional view:
nominal or worst
case delay

Now: probability
density functions
(PDF) for delay

Variation-Aware and Robust Design

- Statistical timing analysis
 - More and more commercial EDA support
- Redundancy
 - Hardware
 - Time
 - Information
 - Algorithmic
- Self-calibrating architectures



Example

Razor




Figure 1. Pipeline stage augmented with Razor latches and control lines.

[D. Ernst et al., IEEE Micro, 2004]

Razor – Error Rates





Figure 3. Measured error rates for an 18x 18-bit field-programmable gate array multiplier block at 90 MHz and 27° C.

[D. Ernst et al., IEEE Micro, 2004]

Robust Systems



Robust implementation compensates static and/or dynamic parameter variations and/or soft errors

- Classical fault tolerant architectures (Self-checking circuits, TMR, ...)
- New self-calibrating, self-adaptive solutions




Challenges

- Design validation/verification must take into account fault tolerance and robustness properties („robustness checking“)
- How much robustness is left after manufacturing?
 - Fault tolerant yield
 - Quality binning


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Self-Checking Circuits



Self-Checking Circuits




An error is detected, if and only if it produces an erroneous output **outside** the output code (**non code word**)

Properties

- Totally self-checking (TSC) goal
 - Faults must be detected when they produce the first erroneous output
- Fault secure (FS)
 - Faults are detected or do not propagate to outputs
- Self-Testing (ST) Avoid fault accumulation
 - Every fault can be detected with at least one input


Problem

- Design strategies for self-checking circuits well-known
- But: synthesis may destroy self-checking properties, e.g. by logic sharing



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


Consequences

- Analysis of circuit robustness is required to
 - check robustness properties after synthesis
 - identify critical nodes / regions
 - compare different circuit implementations


Formal Robustness Checking

[G. Fey et al. 2008, 2009]




ATPG-Based Analysis

- Reuse efficient tools for manufacturing test
- **Automatic Test Pattern Generation (ATPG)** can
 - Generate test patterns
 - Identify redundant faults



Example: Self-Testability

- Self-testable = every fault is detectable
- Use test bench to constrain ATPG
 - Only input codes as patterns
 - Detection only for non code outputs



Strongly Fault-Secure Circuits (SFS)

- Discussed so far
 - Fault-secure (FS)
 - Self-testing (ST) **Avoid fault accumulation**
- Strongly fault-secure (SFS) **Secure fault accumulation**
 Circuit is SFS w.r.t. fault set F :
 For all f in F
 - ST and FS w.r.t. $\{f\}$ or
 - FS for $\{f\}$ and SFS for all sequences $\langle f, g \rangle$


Challenges

- Multiple fault analysis required
- How to compare circuits which are not 100% SFS?

Iterative Robustness Grading

- Classify multiple fault f as
 - insecure (!FS)
 - secure (FS & ST) or
 - unknown (else)
- Study $\{f\} \times F$, if fault is unknown
- At each iteration compute upper and lower bounds


Multiple Fault Analysis



- Unconstrained multiple fault analysis:
 - Rules to determine detectability of multiple faults from properties of single faults
 - E.g. Faults f and g with disjoint output cones:
 $DT(\langle f, g \rangle) = DT(f) \text{ or } DT(g)$

Problem

- Rules cannot be directly applied, new code specific rules are applied
- Example: dual-rail circuit




Experimental Results

- Unordered input and output encoding & inverter-free implementation
- Parity output encoding
- Thread-parallel SAT-based ATPG tool TIGUAN (Freiburg)


Unordered Input and Output Coding

% SFS (single faults)




Parity Output Coding


% SFS (single faults)



Precision for Single and Double Faults



Run Time for Double Faults (Seconds)




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
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Example: Triple Modular Redundancy

- Can compensate both permanent and transient faults
- Used both for yield and reliability improvement




Yield of a TMR System



$$Yield = \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} r(i)p(i)$$


$r(i)$ is i faults tolerated $p(i)$ is i faults occur

Fault Tolerance?



“Fault Tolerant” Yield


- Necessary: refined yield estimation



$$Y_{FT}(k) = \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} r(i+k | i)r(i)p(i)$$


k additional faults tolerated

Example b13



Quality Binning

- Enhanced manufacturing test must classify chips according to quality levels
- Two steps
 - “Functional” Test: Go/NoGo
 - Diagnostic Test with DfT
 - Reveals “functionally redundant” faults
 - Critical faults must be distinguished from tolerable faults



DFG-Project RealTest



- Topics
 - Variation-Aware Testing
 - Design and Test of Robust Systems
- Partners
 - IIS-EAS Dresden (Straube, Vermeiren), U. Freiburg (Becker), U. Stuttgart (Wunderlich), U. Paderborn (Hellebrand), U. Passau (Polian)
- Industrial Board
 - Mentor Graphics Hamburg, Infineon München

Conclusions

- Soft errors and parameter variations require a robust system design
- Robust circuit design comes along with new challenges in
 - design validation/verification
 - yield estimation (traditional vs. “fault tolerant yield”)
 - testing (pass/fail vs. “quality binning”)